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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THERALD N. JENSEN, Executor of 
the Estate of CLARENCE ANDER-
SON, Deceased, 
Pktintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
HENRY 0. ANDERSON and DORO- Case No. 
THY ANDERSON, husband and 11367 
wife, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
vs. 
ROBERT RADAKOVICH, 
Intervenor-Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for specific performance of an 
alleged option to purchase. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court and an advisory 
jury. From a judgment for the Intervenor, the Plain-
tiff and Defendants appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff and Defendants seek reversal of the 
judgment and judgment in their favor as a matter of 
law. 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
One Clarence Anderson died on July 13, 1966, 
and Letters Testamentary on his estate were issued 
on August 9, 1966 to the Plaintiff and Appellant, 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Plaintiff"). On Oc-
tober 11, 1966, the Intervenor and Respondent, (here-
inafter ref erred to as the "Intervenor"), served upon 
the Plaintiff notice that he exercised an alleged Op-
tion to Purchase, purportedly signed by the decendent 
Clarence Anderson, and made a tender of $26,975.00, 
which was refused by the Plaintiff as Executor of 
said decedent's estate. Henry 0. Anderson, Defendant 
and Appellant, (hereinafter referred to as the "De-
fendant"), filed a notice with Plaintiff as Executor 
that he was the owner of an undivided one-half in-
terest in the real property and water stock listed as 
an asset of the aforesaid decedent's estate. The Plain-
tiff thereafter instituted a suit to quiet title as against 
the Defendant Henry 0. Anderson and his wife Doro-
thy, and Robert Radakovich intervened and set up his 
alleged option to purchase. The Plaintiff denied the 
validity of the option; affirmatively alleged that there 
was no consideration for the option; denied that the 
decedent signed the option; affirmatively alleged that 
the decedent was illiterate, and if it was established 
that he did sign the option that he did not understand 
the same; and that the alleged option being incomplete, 
indefinite and uncertain, 1it was unenforceable and 
void. The Defendant denied the validity of the option 
upon the ground that the decedent, in winding up the 
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dissolved partnership that ·at one time existed between 
himself and the decedent, was without authority to 
contract for the sale of partnership a;ssets without his 
express consent, and that title to a portion ·of the prop-
erty described in the alleged option was in the name 
of the Defendant. Thus the issues were joined~ ahd the 
trial held thereon. The lo)-ver court submitted but one 
interrogatory to the jury: "Did Clarence Andersop. 
sign the paper styled 'Option to Purchase' * * * ?"A 
majority of the jurors answered in the affirmative, and 
the lower court adopted the jury's finding, and on all 
the remaining issues, both of fact and of law, found 
in favor of the Intervenor and against the Plaintiff 
and Defendant; fixed the monetary value of the re-
maining interest of Henry Anderson; and provided 
terms of payment by the Intervenor. From this decree 
the Plaintiff and Defendant prosecute this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THAT THE ALLEGED OPTION IS INDEFINITE 
AND UNCERTAIN, AND RESERVED TO THE OP~ 
TIONEE AN UNLIMITED OPTION TO DETERMINE THE 
EXTENT OF HIS ACCEPTANCE OF ITS TERMS. 
The alleged option reserve to the optionee an un-
limited right to determine whether he will purchase 
from the optionee any or all of the property owned by 
the optioner, thereby giving him an unlimited election 
as to whether he would purchase any or all of the range 
ground, and any or all of the sheep. 
As to terms of payment provided for in the al-
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leged option, they lack certainty in several respects. 
There is no specification as to how the payments are 
to be made: annually, semi-annually, or lump sum at 
the end of the term? How the interest was to be paid: 
annually, semi-annually, or monthly? Was there to 
be a conveyance of the real estate and a mortgage 
back to secure payment, or was a contract of sale con· 
templated? If the optionee elected to purchase the 
sheep, and paid down one-fourth of their value, with 
the balance to be paid in 17 years, y,-ould he be required 
to keep the herd at the same level or could he with 
impunity dispose of any or all of the sheep? Obviously, 
numerous questions and situations are suggested by a 
mere reading of the unlimited provisions of the alleged 
option which determine its uncertainty and indefinit-
ness in all particulars. In 12 Arn. J ur. Contracts, 558, 
Sec. 66, it is said: 
A reservation to either party to a contract 
of an unlimited right to determine the nature 
and extent of his performance, renders his obli-
gation too indefinite for legal enforcement. 
In Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 
491, this Court had under consideration an earnest 
money receipt and offer to purchase, of which specific 
perf orrnance was demanded. The offer to purchase, 
under consideration in that case provided that a bal-
ance of $25,000.00 was to be carried by the seller on 
contract or second rnortgage. This Court posed the 
question: 
Which would the court require? * * * How 
4 
are the payments to be made: annually, semi-
annually, or lump sum at the end of the term? 
How was interest to be paid: annually, semian-
nually, or monthly?* * *. 
And, this Court held that the earnest money receipt 
r.nd off e1· to purchase lacked such certainty as to pre-
vent the court from granting specific performance. 
In the instant case, the Plaintiff poses the ques-
tion: Are not the identical uncertainties present in the 
alleged option to purchase now before this Court? 
In Candland v. Oldroyd, 67 Utah 605, 248 Pac. 
1101, this Court quoted with approval Page on Con-
tracts as follows: 
In order to be the basis of a decree of 
specific performance in equity, the contract 
must be so certain that the chancellor's decree 
can specify exactly what must be done in order 
to comply therewith. A lack of certainty as to 
the length of time that the contract is to remain 
in force, or as to the method of securing obli-
gations for def erred payments, prevents specific 
performance. 
However, the district court in the instant case 
did undertake to make certain that which was uncer-
tain, and to specify that the balance of the principal 
should be paid within 17 years; that interest should be 
paid at least anniwlly; and that legal title should re-
main in the beneficiaries under the will of Clarence 
Anderson, deceased, until paid. 
The option to purchase with which we are con-
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c'erned in this cause was personally prepared and draft-
ed by the Intervenor himself. (See: Published deposi-
tion of Robert Radakovich at page 7, lines 21and22). 
Options for the purchase of real estate are usually 
strictly construed as against the person whose right it 
is to exercise the option. Krall v. Light, 210 S.W.2d 
739 and Johnson v. Smith; 269 P.2d 384. And this 
Court held quite specifically· in Maw v. Noble, 10 Utah 
2d 440, 354 P.2d 121 that it is in agreement with the 
well-recognized rule that where there is uncertainty 
or ambiguity the contract should be strictly construed 
against him who draws it. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS NO CONS~DERATION FOR THE AL-
LEGED OPTION. 
The position of the lower court was that an op-
tion itself doesn't require a consideration. (See: Trans-
cript of Proceedings page 7, lines 11 and 12; Trans-
cript of May 20, 1968, page 76, lines 14 and 15, and 
page 79, lines 23 and 24). 
The authorities are in harmony that an option to 
be valid and effective must be supported by a con-
sideration. 91 C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser, p. 848, Sec. 
7, and 55 Am. Jur. Vendor & Purchaser, p. 502, Sec. 
32. 
It is conceded that the authorities disagree as to 
whether a nominal consiqeration is sufficient; how-
ever, in the instant case itis the position of the Plain-
tiff that the alleged option was without consideration. 
The alleged option m question recites: "Con-
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sideration: Robert Radakovich has helped me a lot on 
the place building sheds, with my s~lling ... ancl_; buyfog 
plus numerous other tasks all at no cost to me, which 
would be great if paid for." This is the 3.lleged con-
sideration for the option as stated by the lnterv.enor 
himself, he having personally drafted the alleged. doc~~ 
ment; and the lips of the decedent, Clarence Anderson, 
are sealed by death. This -is the allege9.. opt~on that 
Calvin Rampton, as attorney, suggested to the lnter-
venor should be replaced by a legal one. (See: Publish-
ed deposition of Robert Radakovich at page 14, lines 
21 and 22, and page 15, lines 1, 2 and 3). Specifically 
and unequivocally, the reference in the alleged option 
is to a past consideration which would support no 
promise whatever. In 17 C.J.S. Contracts, pages 837-
38, Sec. 116, appears a concise statement on this sub-
ject: 
* * * by the great weight of authority a 
past consideration, if it imposed no legal obli-
gation at the time it was furnished, will sup-
port no promise whatever. * * * 
A past consideration, it is said, is some 
act or f orebearance in times past by which a m~ 
has benefited without thereby incurring any 
legal liability; if afterward, whether from a 
good feeling or :from interested motives, he 
makes a promise to the person by whose act or 
forebearance has benefited, and that promise is 
made on no other consideration than the past 
benefit, it is gratuitdus and cannot be enforced; 
it is based on motive and not consideration. Thus 
services rendered or money expended in the past, 
but not at the express or implied request of the 
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person benefited by them, or at his request but 
without an understanding that they were to be 
paid for, will not support a promise by him to 
pay for them. 
And, it is further stated in the same authority at page 
778, Sec. 90 : 
Where services are rendered and benefits 
conferred without any request and under cir-
cumstances rendering lack of expectation to be 
compensated therefor highly improbable, no ob-
ligation to make such compensation arises and a 
promise founded on motives of honor or grati-
tude is not a sufficient consideration. 
The purported consideration recited in the alleged 
option is not supported by the evidence-there is testi-
mony, both oral and documentary, that the help ren-
dered Clarence Anderson by the Intervenor, was not 
at no cost. 
Assuming for purpose of argument that the In-
tervenor had helped the decedent at no cost to him, and 
that this created a moral obligation on the part of the 
decedent to compensate the Intervenor, such moral 
obligation would not constitute a valid consideration. 
In Manwill v. Oyler, 11 Utah 2d 433, 361 P.2d 177, 
this court said: 
The rule quite generally recognized is that 
a moral obligation by itself will not do so (con-
stitute a valid consideration). Although some 
authorities appear to be otherwise, it will usual-
ly be found that there are special circumsta~ces 
bolstering what is termed the moral obligat10n. 
The difficulty we see with the doctrine is that 
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if a mere moral, as distinguished from a legal 
obligation were recognized as valid considera-
tion for a contract, that would practically erode 
to the vanishing point the necessity for finding 
consideration. This is so, first because in nearly 
all circumstances where a promise is made there 
is some moral aspect of the situation which pro-
vides the motivation for making the promise 
even if it is to make an outright gift. And sec-
ond, if we are dealing with moral concepts, the 
making of a promise itself creates a moral ob-
ligation to perform it. It seems obvious that if 
a contract to be legally enforceable need be any-
thing other than a naked promise, something 
more than a mere moral consideration is neces-
sary. The principle that in order for a contract 
to be valid and binding, each party must be 
bound to give some legal consideration to the 
other by conferring a benefit upon him or suf-
fering a legal detriment at his request is firmly 
implanted in the roots of our law. 
In the instant cause, we have a situation where, 
under any justifiable theory, there was no considera-
tion whatever for the execution of the alleged option. 
The evidence fails to support the Intervenor that he 
helped the deceased a lot on the place building sheds, 
selling and buying, and other tasks, all at no cost to 
the deceased. The alleged option itself is reputed to be 
upon a past consideration which will not support it. 
Viewerl in the light that there was a moral obligation 
npon the part of the deceased, such moral obligation 
did not constitute a valid consideration. 
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, POINT III 
PREJUDICIAL COMMENTS OF THE LOWER COURT 
IN THE PRESENCE OF 'THE JURY. 
The district court by inuendo indicated to the 
jurors that it had an unfavorable opinion as related to 
the testimony of expert witnesses. (See: Transcript 
of Proceedings pg. 202, lines 3 and 4) ; and reference 
to the Transcript of Proceedings discloses the lower 
court's impatience with the testimony of Plaintiff's 
highly qualified handwriting expert. (See: Transcript 
of Proceedings pg. 161 lines 19 and 20); and the argu-
mentative statements of the court in the presence of the 
jury were most prejudicial. (See: Transcript of Pro-
ceedings, p. 161, lines 1 to 3 and 13 to 16; page 167, 
lines 9 and 10; pg. 197, lines 6, 7, 11, 12 and 13; page 
200, lines 4 and 5; comments of the court on pages 202 
and 203; page 205 lines 8 to 16; and page 299 lines 
3 to 8.) 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN THE GIVING OF 
ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 12. 
By instructing the jury that the Plaintiff was 
"trying to defeat the effect of the written instrument 
£ntitled 'Option to Purchase' ", the court impliedly in-
structed the jury that the Plaintiff was at fault in 
prosecuting the law suit, and that his efforts to defeat 
the option had failed. 
The execution of the alleged "Option to Purchase" 
having been placed in issue, and the signing of same 
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by the deceased having been denied; the burden of 
going forward with the evidence shifted to the Plain-
tiff, but the burden of proof, or risk of non-persuasion, 
remained with the Intervenor thtoughout the trial to 
establish the due and valid execution of th~ ,alleged 
"Option to Purchase." HQwever, the district court's 
instruction "that as a written instrument, said 'Op-
tion to Purchase' is endowed with a presumption of 
validity." And that, "This presumption of validity can 
only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence and 
the burden is on the defendant (Plaintiff) as Execute>r 
of the estate of Clarence Anderson, deceased, to produce 
such clear and convincing evidence." Such instruction 
placed the full burden of proof on the Plaintiff to sus-
tain his position. 32 C.J .S. Evidence, p. 793, Sec. 625 
reads: 
The admission of the instrument on pre-
liminary proof of its execution does not relieve 
the party of the burden of proving to the jury 
its due and valid execution, and questions as to 
its genuineness, the weight to be accorded Jt, 
and the like, are for the jury. 
The Intervenor was the one upon whom first fell 
the duty of going forward with evidence. After mee~ 
ing that duty, and making out a prima facie case, the 
burden shifted to the Plaintiff, but the risk of non-
persuasion never shifted, and remained the burden of 
the Intervenor throughout the trial. Kartchner v. 
Horne, 1Utah2d 112, 262 P. 2d 749. 
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POINT V 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS REFUSAL TO 
GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INTERROGATORY 
NO. 2. 
"Did the deceased know or understand what he 
was signing or as a reasonable person should he have 
known or understood what he was signing?" The dis-
trict court regarded the illiteracy of the deceased as 
a question of law. (See: Transcript, page 49, lines 6 to 
10; and page 54, line 26; page 55 and page 56, lines 
lto7). 
POINT VI 
BY ITS DECREE THE LOWER COURT AWARDED 
THE INTERVENOR LANDS NOT EMBRACED WITHIN 
THE ALLEGED "OPTION TO PURCHASE." 
The alleged option covers "From 3,800 to 4,200 
acres of range ground located at Scofield, Carbon 
County, Utah * * *."And, "The farm located in Miller 
Creek consisting of around 200 acres* * *."The lower 
court's decree, in addition, covers 160 acres of land 
classified in the Findings and Decree as Mountain land 
which is in the joint names of Clarence Anderson and 
Henry 0. Anderson, one of the defendants in the ac-
tion. This land is described as the SE% of Section 34, 
Township 12 South, Range 7 East, SLB & M. (Page 
4 of the Findings, page 2 of the Decree) . The lower 
court's Findings in addition also include 640 acres de-
scribed as valley land and specifically described as all 
of Section 2, Township 15 South, Range 9 East SLB & 
M. (Page 5 of the Findings, and page 3 of the Decree). 
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The lands in Section 16 and 21, Township 15 
South, Range 10 East, SLB & M. descrited at page 5 
of the Findings and page 3 of the Decree total 240 
acres which exceeds the 200 acres of farm land in 
Miller Creek ref erred to in the alleged option. The 640 
acres of land in Section 2 is in a different township and 
range and is not in Miller Creek but is located ap-
proximately four miles Northwesterly from the farm 
on Miller Creek. This 640 acres was acquired by Clar-
ence Anderson after the date of the alleged option and 
was purchased by him from the State of Utah. This 
640 acres is not farming land and cannot be farmed 
as the same lies above the irrigation canals. 
The Intervenor did not introduce any testimony 
at the trial to identify the particular tracts of land as 
being within the general descripton of "range land 
located at Scofield" and "farm land located in Miller 
Creek" as set forth in the alleged option. All that was 
introduced was the Inventory and Appraisement in the 
probate proceedings in the Clarence Anderson estate. 
This inventory at best could only be construed to de-
scribe the land that Clarence Anderson owned at the 
time of his death and would not be evidence of what 
he owned on the date of the alleged option. 
POINT VII 
THE ALLEGED OPTION IS NOT BINDING UPON 
THE PARTNERSHIP OR THE SURVIVING PARTNER. 
The property which is the subject of the alleged 
option belonged to the partnership comprised of the 
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decedent, Clarence Anderson, and the defendant, 
Henry 0. Anderson. Record title to part of the land 
was and still is in the name of Clarence and title to 
part was and still is in the name of Henry. By mutual 
agreement Henry withdrew from the partnership and 
Clarence continued to operate the partnership prop-
erty. No final settlement was made prior to the death 
of Clarence. The alleged option was not signed by 
Henry and Henry had no knowledge of its execution 
by Clarence. (See Stipulation and Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law in case file.) 
That the partnership was not terminated by the 
withdrawal of Henry is made clear by Sec. 48-1-27, 
UCA, 1953, which provides as follows: 
"On dissolution a partnership is not termi-
nated, but continues until the winding up of 
partnership affairs is completed." 
Sec. 48-1-32, UCA, 1953, specifies the authority 
of a partner to bind the partnership after dissolution, 
providing in part: 
" ( 1) After dissolution a partner can bind 
the partnership, ... : 
(a) By any act appropriate for winding up 
partnership affairs or completing trans-
actions unfinished at dissolution." 
It seems clear that the option given by Clarence 
does not come within the meaning of the provision 
"completing transactions unfinished at dissolution". 
There were no negotiations for sale of the property to 
intervenor pending at the time of dissolution. 
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The precise question is whether or not the option 
to sell all of the partnership property given by one o:f 
the partners after dissolution falls within the meaning 
of "any act appropriate for winding up partnership 
affairs". Winding up of partnership affairs m2ans 
the administration of the 'assets for the purpose of 
terminating the business and discharging the obliga-
tions of the partnership to its creditors and members. 
Duncan v. Bartle (Oregon, 1950), 216 P.2d 1005, 
1013. 
The general rule as to the power of a partner 
after dissolution is set forth in 40 Am. Jur, Partner-
ship 318, Sec. 274, as follows: 
"Upon the dissolution or termination of a 
partnership the general agency of. one partner 
for his copartners ceases, although the mutual 
agency to a certain extent is prolonged until 
the affairs of the partnership are administered 
and wound up. As between themselves, neither 
partner after dissolution has any power what-
ever to act for or bind the other. And as regards 
third persons, the dissolution of the partnership 
works an absolute · revocation of all implied 
authority in either of the partners to bind the 
other to new contracts or obligations, or to create 
any new cause of action binding copartners or 
the firm, except when made by express author-
·t " 1 y; ... 
Of similar import is 68 CJS Partnership, 868, 
Sec. 362: 
"The general rule is that the dissolution. of 
a partnership terminates the implied authonty 
of each partner to enter into new obligations 
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on behalf of the firm or of his copartners; but 
this rule does not prevent the contracting or in-
curring of obligations, in the due course of set-
tling the affairs of the partnership, by reason 
of transactions prior to the dissolution." 
As to the power of a liquidating partner in wind-
ing up the partnership, 40 Am Jur, Partnership 325, 
Sec. 283 states: 
"By virtue of his appointment he does not 
possess any power he did not have before, and 
without express authorization he cannot bind 
the partnership in any manner or for any pur-
pose not before within the ordinary powers of 
a partner. Thus, a liquidating partner cannot 
make new contracts, or create new liabilities 
as by giving promissory notes binding on the 
firm; nor can he extend the time for the pay-
ment of existing obligations of the firm, or make 
acknowledgements of the validity of claims 
against the firm. For the purpose of winding up 
the concern however, the liquidating partner has 
the same general power to bind the firm as he 
had before, and may bind the partnership by 
borrowing money to meet its accruing liabilities, 
and may sell its real estate to raise money to 
pay its debts." 
At the time the alleged option was executed by 
the deceased there was no necessity to sell the property 
in order to pay partnership debts. The option constitut· 
ed a new contract, of which the defendant had no 
knowledge. By the terms of the option, Intervenor was 
to have 6 years in which to exercise it and if exercised, 
a 17 year period in which to make payment. This con· 
stituted a new obligation upon the partnership which 
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was beyond the power of the deceased to make. When 
a partnership is dissolved the authority of one partner 
to create a new obligation for the partnership is re-
voked and his agency for his copartners ends. Credit 
Bureau of San Diego v. Beach (Calif. 1956), 301 P 
2nd 87, 90. 
CONCLUSION 
The decree and judgment of the lower court should 
be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
S. J. SWEETRING 
Attorney for Plaintiff & 
Appellant 
FRANDSEN and KELLER 
Attorneys for Defendants & 
Appellant 
17 
